Scholars have described an explosion of consultation in the last decades of the twentieth century, characterized by the proliferation of new deliberative assemblies. I propose a fiscal theory of consultation to explain this phenomenon. Democratic states are likely to grant citizens rights of binding consultation at times of fiscal stress, when intensive state extraction of resources provokes citizen resistance that results in procedural concessions. Three mechanisms--escalation by citizens, anticipatory consultation by state officials, and information arbitrage by nongovernmental intermediaries--promote continued innovation in the modes of such consultation. Historical and quantitative evidence concerning the evolution of public consultation in California and New York supports the application of this theory to the late-twentieth-century consultation explosion.
scholars such as Lee and Romano (2010) , Sirianni and Friedland (2001) , and Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009) . Governments and interest groups have long sought to elicit the participation of the public by means of such techniques as public opinion polls and voter registration drives. What sets apart the new techniques for "collecting feedback" is their collective and deliberative character. At their most basic, all of these techniques, whether they be called community conversations or visioning sessions or Deliberative Polls Explaining the rise of the new deliberative assemblies is of considerable scholarly interest because of their problematic status in democratic theory. In contrast to the anonymous, massmediated election campaigns of the 21 st century, the new assemblies involve face-to-face discussion and deliberation of the kind that we may associate with idealized images of the classical polis or the New England town meeting. It can be tempting to see in them a revival of the ideal of participatory democracy (cf. Pateman 1970 , Poletta 1998 . On the other hand, the new deliberative assemblies are typically small, temporary, privately facilitated, irregularly scheduled, and open by invitation only to people who meet sometimes informal and only vaguely defined criteria for participation. All of these characteristics may limit access to these occasional assemblies in ways that seem inconsistent with democratic ideals of equal participation. For example, there is some evidence that those who participate tend to be highly educated, highincome people who already have disproportionate voice in the American political order, much like the Los Angeles businesspeople convened by California Forward (California Forward 2009; Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009: 48-52; cf. Schlozman et al. 2005) . We might worry whether the rise of the new deliberative assemblies is symptomatic of a broader retreat from democracy.
In this chapter, my purpose is not normative evaluation, but sociological explanation; I conceptualize the new deliberative assemblies as a form of consultation between states and citizens, and attempt to explain their rise in late twentieth century California by drawing on a general theory of where such innovations come from. State officials and citizens invent new forms of consultation in order to manage the potentially conflictual process of bargaining over the allocation of shared burdens and benefits. Explaining the emergence of any particular innovation in forms of consultation thus requires attention to the historical sequence of forms that preceded it, since such innovations are likely to be introduced only when previous modes of consultation have failed. In particular, as the example of the Great Consultation illustrates, the emergence of the new deliberative assemblies-like the emergence of other techniques of public consultation from elections to public opinion polling-resulted from social conflicts over the appropriation and distribution of public resources. To understand the rise of the new deliberative assemblies we need to turn to fiscal sociology.
THE PARADOX OF PARTICIPATION, ILLUSTRATED WITH THE CASE OF LATE 20 TH CENTURY CALIFORNIA
To explain the rise of the new deliberative assemblies we must first describe it. Social 4 scientists in the 1960s observed increasing demands for political participation on the part of formerly excluded people around the world, and anticipated a coming "participation explosion" that would transform governance across the globe (Almond and Verba 1963: 4) . But the following decades brought something different in the United States. Instead of a rise in mass civic activity, the next decade saw a decline. Voter turnout began to trend downward, as illustrated for the case of California by Figure 1 . Other forms of civic participation fell off even more precipitously. National survey data over the same period show that fewer and fewer people attended political rallies, volunteered for political parties, served on local committees, participated actively in clubs or associations, or showed up for public meetings on local affairs (Putnam 2000: 45, 60-61) . This decline in routine forms of political participation may have been partly balanced by an increase in irregular, informal, and occasional forms of participation-for example, even as fewer and fewer Americans reported attending political rallies in the previous election cycle in the last decades of the twentieth century, slightly more Americans reported having signed a petition or attended a demonstration at least once in their lives (Norris 2002: 200-1; Caren, Ghoshal and Ribas 2010: 1, 4)-but at best such data moderate the impression of declining participation. There was no apparent explosion of demands for public participation in the U.S. 3 The literature provides little reason to think that the share of the public participating in civic affairs has increased since Putnam's work was completed. For example, Norris (2002) 2002: 117) . The literature on other forms of participation is also consistent with a picture of stagnation or decline in the share of the public that is civically engaged. For example, Caren, Ghoshal and Ribas (2010) note that the rise in the percentage of people who report having attended a demonstration at least once in their life is attributable to the rising share of survey respondents who were young adults in the 1960s, rather than to any secular increase in civic participation; and Smith et al. (2009) show that those who engage in political activity on the internet consist mostly of people who already report above average levels of offline civic participation as well-implying that internet-mediated civic participation, while novel, has not much expanded the percentage of the public that participates in politics.
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[ Figure 1 here]
At the same time, there was an explosion in the supply of opportunities for ritualized consultation, as public and private organizations in the U.S. institutionalized various new forms of consultation with the public. A longer time series can help us put the rise of these forms of public consultation in historical perspective. In the absence of survey data or organizational directories covering a sufficiently long period, I rely on a time series of the number of articles mentioning a "public workshop" or a "town hall forum" in the Los Angeles Times. Although the data are obviously subject to all of the potential biases of newspaper reporting, the general picture of change over time that this indicator provides is consistent with what scholars have found using other data sources.
4 Sirianni and Friedland (2001) , relying on case studies constructed by a combination of interviews and archival research, date the emergence of public consultation to government agencies in the 1970s, with increasing uptake by nongovernmental organizations in the 1980s and 1990s. Lee and Romano (2010) rely on various interview and documentary sources to date the birth of the "field of professional public engagement facilitation" (2010: 19) roughly to the 1980s. And Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini's survey of 396 organizations "that plan and run public forums " (2009: 142) found that two thirds of the organizations they were able to identify and survey had been founded since 1980. In short, something changed in the 1970s that began to increase the availability of occasions for public deliberation.
[ Figure 2 ] 4 I selected these search terms as appropriate indicators of long-run change because-unlike neologisms such as "ChoiceDialogue TM " or "stakeholder convening"-they were in use by the early twentieth century to describe assemblies, increasing my confidence that the time series represents changes in the frequency with which such assemblies are mentioned, rather than changes in the words used to describe them. The graph shows the trend in the number of articles mentioning public workshops or town hall forums, but the overall picture is the same if we instead examine the fraction of Los Angeles Times articles mentioning public workshops or town hall forums.
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This, then, is the paradox of participation: certain temporary occasions for the public to consult on civic decisions proliferated, even as the share of the public participating in politics appeared to be on the wane. The paradox is resolved if we shift our attention from average civic participation to the increasing dispersion of civic participation: the trend is towards participatory inequality, as public officials have come to engage in more intensive consultation with a smaller share of the populace. And to explain this trend, we must shift our attention from the demand for participation in general, the sort of thing indexed by Figure 1 , to the supply of opportunities to consult on particular decisions. Under what conditions do organizational elites seek to intensify their consultation with particular segments of the public? In order to answer this question, I offer a fiscal theory of consultation that draws on classic works in the sociology of democratic government. The answer that theory provides, in its briefest form, is that organizational elites may institute new forms of consultation with particular publics when their organizations depend on those publics' willingness to provide material resources.
THE FISCAL SOCIOLOGY OF CONSULTATION
The fiscal theory of consultation presented here is a generalization of the fiscal theory of democratization. The latter draws on the classic tradition of "fiscal sociology" associated with the Austrian scholars Rudolf Goldscheid (1917) and Joseph Schumpeter (1918) . These two scholars sought to explain the rise of constitutional democracy as a byproduct of the need for taxation in the competitive state system of early modern Europe. Later scholars refined their theoretical arguments and tested their ideas with comparative data; noteworthy contributions to 7 the theoretical literature include Bates and Lien (1985) , Levi (1989 ), and Tilly (1992 , 2007 ). My exposition of the theory draws particularly on the later work of Charles Tilly (2007 Tilly ( , 2009 ), but my generalization of the theory to the case of the new deliberative assemblies is perhaps more in the spirit of Goldscheid and Schumpeter, both of whom went beyond asserting the importance of fiscal policy for understanding the origins of democratic government to hypothesize that the fiscal needs of the state shaped many important features of civil society as well (Goldscheid 1917: 3; Schumpeter 1991 Schumpeter [1918 : 100). In this section I explain how and why the fiscal needs of the state might be relevant to the explanation of the consultation explosion in the late twentieth century U.S., and late twentieth century California in particular.
The fiscal theory of democratization begins with the premise that democracy is best understood as an institutionalized form of consultation between state officials and citizens, where the state is conceptualized in realist terms as a coercion-wielding organization that exists in a field of such organizations (see Tilly 2007) . We may define a state more specifically as a compulsory membership organization that successfully claims rule-making priority "over all other users of coercion within a given territory" (Tilly 1992: 44; see Weber 1922) , and we may define a citizen as anyone with compulsory membership in that organization.
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The problem for a theory of democracy is to explain why officials of any state should bother to consult with its citizens. The answer is not obvious, for at least two reasons. First, because a state is an organization that sets the rules for the use of coercion, discontented citizens have little bargaining leverage in their negotiations with state officials. It is hard to get anything by negotiation when the other party has all the weapons. Second, because membership in the state is compulsory, exit is not usually a viable option for discontented citizens. It is hard to bargain for greater democracy 5 For convenience, I do not distinguish between the rights-bearing citizens of a state and the subjects of a ruler. 8 when you cannot plausibly threaten to go shopping for a more democratic state to live in.
The prospects for democratic government therefore depend on conditions that improve the bargaining position of citizens. One such condition that is particularly important is the state's mode of resource acquisition (Tilly 2007 (Tilly , 2009 . States may acquire resources by various means, from plundering neighboring territories to selling scarce natural resources on world markets. But in the long run, state officials have found it most lucrative to define and protect a sphere of private property rights within their territory, and to appropriate for the state only a share of the private resources produced by their subjects (Tilly 2009; Ardant 1965) . This mode of resource acquisition, which, following Tilly (2009), I call "extraction," can take the form of temporary labor obligations (such as corvée or conscription), or of taxes levied in money or in kind (see Tilly 1992 Tilly , 2009 . What all of these forms of extraction have in common is that they make the state dependent on the productivity of its citizens and thereby improve the bargaining position of the latter.
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All of the ways in which states acquire resources may involve conflict, but extraction gives state officials reasons to resolve that conflict peacefully. Citizens may resist the extractive demands of state officials, and in the face of such resistance officials may be tempted to resort to force. But state officials will ordinarily restrain their use of coercion because they need their citizens to remain alive and productive-and perhaps even, to some degree, positively willing (Levi 1989)-if those citizens are to continue supplying the state with taxes or labor services.
Dead or jailed citizens are not much use as taxpayers, and a surly, foot-dragging taxpayer is not as productive as a happy one. Conflicts over extraction therefore tend to end in bargained settlements between state officials and citizens, rather than in total victory for either side (Tilly 2007: 142) .
Although the classic treatments of the fiscal theory of democratization emphasized conflicts over resource extraction, nothing in the fiscal theory of democratization assumes that extraction is the only source of conflict between states and citizens. Indeed, the history of contentious interactions between citizens and states is filled with conflicts over language rights, religious freedom, the conditions of labor, and countless other questions. But even when the conflict concerns other issues, as with religious civil wars, the fact that state officials are extracting resources from citizens is often what leads rebellious citizens to direct their ire against the state, rather than against other citizens; and the fact that state officials depend on citizens for resources is what gives state officials an incentive to resolve such conflicts by bargaining a settlement.
The bargain typically goes beyond agreement on a particular division of resources to encompass agreement on rights and duties of consultation over the extraction of additional resources in the future (Tilly 2007: 142) . Citizens demand a binding commitment to consult with them in the future because they are interested in security against unpredictable or arbitrary demands. State officials, for their part, often find it advantageous to commit themselves to a future process of consultation because such consultation can reduce the cost of acquiring information about how much extraction citizens will tolerate (Bates and Lien 1985) . Early constitutions that formalized the creation of parliaments and competitive elections are classic examples of such bargains (see, e.g., Mann 1985 , Ross 2004 . But fiscal bargains may also go beyond parchment institutions to include informal institutions whose rules are not codified in any document. "In relatively democractic regimes, competitive elections certainly give citizens a voice," Tilly wrote, "but so do lobbying, petitioning, referenda, social movements, and opinion polling" (2007: 13). All of these are examples of routine forms of consultation that might be invented, tolerated, or institutionalized as part of a fiscal bargain.
The fiscal theory of democratization was invented to explain the origins of democratic government, but in the remainder of this section I will argue that the basic logic of the theory suggests that even regimes that are already democratic will continually invent new institutions and procedures for public consultation. There are at least three mechanisms that will tend to generate such continual invention.
The first mechanism is the tendency for citizens' demands to escalate. When state officials strike a fiscal bargain that includes procedural concessions to their citizens, they change the process by which future fiscal bargains will be negotiated. A state may grant voting rights to the majority of its citizens, e.g., as the price of extracting resources from them. But even after state officials have struck this bargain, the need may arise for more resources, and with it the risk of a new round of resistance and bargaining. The resistance of already-enfranchised citizens cannot be calmed by promising them the right to vote: they have it already. Moreover, they may use it to demand and win additional rights of consultation. In short, each new mode of consultation confers additional leverage on citizens. They may use that leverage to extract procedural concessions that include new modes of consultation.
The mechanism of escalating demands is most likely to apply when state officials confront new demands for spending and when they elect to meet those demands with a strategy of intensive extraction. By intensive extraction, I refer to an increase in the rate at which state officials appropriate resources that are already subject to some state claims--e.g., an increase the rate of an existing tax. The alternative is extensive extraction, which refers to the appropriation of new categories of resources to which the state previously laid no claim--e.g., a broadening of the tax base to encompass a new category of property, or the conscription of a previously exempt category of person. Both strategies may provoke resistance. But intensive extraction is especially likely to affect citizens who have been taxed before, and who have already won procedural concessions in prior rounds of resistance and bargaining. Intensive extraction is therefore particularly likely to result in escalating demands for consultation.
Note that the mechanism of escalating demands may exacerbate political inequality.
Because canny state officials often target the citizens with the most resources for intensive extraction, any procedural concessions they offer in exchange are likely to be offered first to those citizens who are comparatively economically advantaged. And because the citizens targeted for intensive extraction are precisely those who are most likely to have been granted procedural concessions already in prior rounds of bargaining, their escalating demands for consultation may result in the accretion of political rights by those who are already politically advantaged, too. In the long run, the mechanism of escalating demands contributes to the process of democratization. But in the short run, it may actually exacerbate inequalities of political voice -much as the earliest parliaments increased the political rights of the nobility relative to the rights of peasants.
The second mechanism is what I call anticipatory consultation. The interests of state officials in securing a predictable revenue stream may motivate them to invent new forms of consultation. State officials in democratic regimes know that they will need to consult with their citizens over resources in the future. They will often attempt to acquire intelligence in advance about the bargain they can hope to obtain. In order to get that information, they may be forced to invent or adopt new forms of consultation that allow them to anticipate future bargains. For this purpose they will usually prefer non-binding forms of consultation--hearings, listening sessions, and the like--that provide them with information without limiting their freedom of action.
The third mechanism is information arbitrage. Democratic regimes will continue to incubate new forms of consultation as long as there are opportunities for nongovernmental actors to profit by brokering the exchange of information. State officials and citizens have a shared interest in replacing the costly and unpredictable dialectic of extraction and rebellion with routinized and predictable forms of consultation. But no form of consultation is perfect.
Intermediaries who promise new ways to make consultation easier, more informative, and more predictable therefore may be able to insert themselves as brokers between state officials and citizens. Examples of such intermediaries include political parties, interest group lobbies, and public opinion polling firms. By solving a common problem, such intermediaries can make themselves indispensable to state officials and citizens alike. They may thereby reap prestige, material rewards, and power in the form of subtle influence over the public agenda. Often such organizations seek to position themselves as information brokers in order to advance a particular substantive agenda: an interest group lobby, for example, may advance its constituents' interests most effectively by developing a reputation as a credible broker that can supply officials with reliable information about what constituents will tolerate, and constituents with reliable information about what officials will do. Other intermediaries, such as some non-partisan polling and campaign consulting firms, may have no particular substantive agenda beyond seeking for their own sake the profits, prestige, or power that accrue to information arbitrageurs. The crucial point is simply that those who invent new processes of consultation-and insert themselves into those processes as expert brokers of consultation-may enjoy advantages, and that such advantages create an incentive for innovation.
The three mechanisms of escalation, anticipatory consultation, and information arbitrage may help to explain why the institutions of democratic consultation have generally evolved in a particular sequence. Consider a stylized history of the sequence in which practices of consultation emerged in modern European democracies. The history of such practices in Europe began in the middle ages with sporadic rebellions, and then proceeded to parliaments, followed by the right to petition, then competitive elections, then referenda, then opinion polls, and finally focus groups and the other forms of consultation that I have called the new deliberative assemblies. This sequence does not follow from any technological necessity-in principle, the focus group was as feasible in the time of Charlemagne as it is today-but the sequence has an immanent logic that might be expected from the three mechanisms of escalation, anticipatory consultation, and information arbitrage. Citizens escalated their demands, using one form of consultation to demand the next form of consultation on the list-as when European rebels demanded a parliament, or parliaments demanded that citizens be granted the right to petition, or petitioners asked for the suffrage (see Tilly 2004 Tilly , 2009 ). State officials embraced new forms of anticipatory consultation-as when elected officials examined results of a referendum to anticipate how a candidate would do, or read opinion polls to anticipate the results of a referendum, or convened a focus group to help them predict the most favorable wording on an opinion poll. Finally, parties, interest groups, and consulting firms have invented and marketed new forms of consultation in order to secure positions as mediators between state officials and citizens.
Can this theory account for the consultation explosion in California since the 1970s? The theory does offer reasons to think that any given conflict over state extraction may result in new forms of consultation, but that is not the same as predicting that any given boom in new forms of consultation results from a conflict over extraction. Nothing in the theory suggests that conflicts over state extraction of resources are the only or the most important source of innovation in modes of consultation. If this theory helps to explain the consultation explosion at all, then we should expect to observe a few things about the rise of new deliberative assemblies.
First, if the theory sheds light on this case, then we should expect to find that state officials were central innovators in the new deliberative assemblies, and that conflicts over state resources were the original sites of the recent institutional innovation. This hypothesis need not imply that states are the only organizations to use the new deliberative assemblies. Consider the secret-ballot election: although this mode of consultation is commonly used in the governance of private organizations, for example, the central claim of the fiscal theory of consultation is that this form of consultation originated and diffused globally in the course of conflicts between states and citizens over the public purse. By analogy, we might expect to observe that the new deliberative assemblies received their early impetus from conflicts over extraction of resources.
And this prediction is, indeed, consistent with what some scholars have reported about the rise of new deliberative assemblies. Sirianni and Friedland (2001) , for example, describe cases in which renaissance of civic participation began with federal mandates for government agencies to solicit public participation, and only later spread to nongovernmental organizations. Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009) Fourth, we should expect to observe path dependence. Initial bargains will be conditional on the content of earlier bargains over rights of consultation. Different states that make similar fiscal demands may therefore yield different forms of consultation, depending on the prior rights 7 An exact measure of this overrepresentation is impossible to estimate without more detail about how Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini defined an independent organization for the purposes of their sampling procedure. But as a point of comparison, the Census records 89,527 federal, state, or local governmental units, equivalent to 6 governmental units for every 100 private not-for-profit organizations in the U.S., and 2 governmental units for every 100 private organizations with employees. If one adds the total number of governmental units to the denominator of these ratios, then it is possible to calculate that independent governmental organizations comprise fewer than 6% of all nonprofit or governmental organizations, and fewer than 2% of all public or private organizations with employees. The numerator in these calculations refers to the total of federal, state, and local "governmental units" to note that "California depends almost entirely upon the general property tax for state, county, and municipal revenues" (Plehn 1907: 660) , whereas New York "has developed a system of state taxes which makes the state government practically independent of the general property tax" (1907: 756) . These divergent strategies of extraction led to different patterns of resistance and bargaining, and thereby ultimately to different patterns of public consultation in general.
The decision of California's officials to intensify the taxation of property provoked resistance from real property owners. Farmers in particular resented the state's general property
York Times was consistently a far larger publication over this period, and reported far fewer deliberative assemblies. The relative shift might reflect a California-specific shift in reporters' biases--perhaps the new deliberative assemblies simply became much more culturally salient to California reporters?--but any such cultural shift would be hard to explain without assuming that there was, in fact, a greater quantitative prevalence of actual assemblies in California. The basic comparative picture is validated by other indicators of innovation in forms of political consultation in this period. Walker's (2009) analysis of the national population of grassroots political consulting firms listed in trade directories since the 1970s, e.g., includes a dummy variable for California firms, because the state is such a statistical outlier in the number of such firms. tax because they felt it burdened them unfairly (Clemens 1997: 178-9). Although it was nominally a tax on all wealth, owners of financial wealth found it easy to hide their assets or move them across county lines. A farm was a kind of wealth that was hard to hide and therefore easy to tax. State officials calculated that farmers paid 10% of their income in property taxes, in contrast to "persons engaged in manufactures," who paid an average of 2% (California Commission on Revenue and Taxation 1906: 9).
Farmers blamed this unfair distribution of the tax burden on a lack of democracy. To be sure, most adult male farmers in the state had the right to vote in California elections. 9 The California Constitution of 1879 granted the suffrage to adult male citizens with the exceptions that "no native of China, no idiot, insane person, or person convicted of any infamous crime, and no person hereafter convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this state" (Article 2, Section 1).
Farmers therefore demanded both tax relief and procedural reforms. The link between extraction and consultation was illustrated vividly for the state's property tax payers in 1909.
Years of grassroots agitation by farm organizations "'whereasing' and 'resolving' on tax reform" had finally persuaded the governor to appoint a tax commission that would recommend a new revenue strategy for the state (Plehn 1911: 86) . The commission's first proposal failed at the ballot in 1908 because urban voters feared that it would simply increase their property taxes further, but a revised proposal, put forward by a reconstituted tax commission, appeared poised (Olin 1966 , Rogin 1968 .
[ Figure 3 here]
The election resulted in a new fiscal bargain that included new rights of consultation. The
Johnson administration received the support of property tax payers. In exchange, it agreed to tax reforms that would slow future property tax increases, and it established new institutions for consulting voters over future tax increases.
In New York, there was no such bargain struck because state officials did not intensify their extraction of property taxes. Instead they followed an extensive revenue strategy that provoked only scattered and piecemeal resistance. State legislators gradually reduced the burden on property tax payers by enacting a variety of new taxes. They began with a franchise tax on corporations in 1880; a long list of selective taxes followed, most notably an inheritance tax in 1885 and a particularly lucrative liquor tax in 1896 (Newcomer 1917: 59, 63) . Each of these taxes provoked resistance and bargaining by the affected constituency-the corporation tax in particular provoked "a great deal of litigation" (1917: 59)-but the gradual division of the tax burden among multiple constituencies over an extended period limited the size of the coalition that formed to protest any given tax.
As long as New York State did not intensify its extraction of property taxes, demands for 21 intensive consultation did not arouse much enthusiasm at the grass roots. New York farmers were slow to take up the cause of the initiative and referendum (Goebel 2002: 107) . Advocates complained in 1909 that the New York State legislature treated their proposal for direct legislation as "a joke" (Schmidt 1989: 254) . Comparative evidence suggests that the weakness of agrarian Populism and the strength of traditional patronage party organizations kept initiative and referendum off of the legislative agenda in New York and many other eastern states (Bowler and Donovan 2006; Shefter 1983) . New Yorkers might have had a brief window of opportunity to circumvent the legislature and introduce these forms of intensive consultation at the state constitutional convention of 1915, but the rural delegations were dominated by conservative
Republicans who "prevented any serious discussion of direct democracy" (Goebel 2002: 108) . 
Extraction and consultation in the 1970s
These different fiscal bargains struck in the Progressive Era had important consequences for the subsequent evolution of consultation in California and New York. In the 1960s, growing public expenses for education, welfare, and local infrastructure again required state and especially local officials to find new strategies for appropriating resources. This time, officials in both California and New York chose intensive strategies of extraction that relied heavily on the property tax, and both states thereby triggered cycles of resistance and bargaining. But the outcome was different because of prior bargains they had struck in the Progressive Era.
In both states, judicial pressure forced legislators to modernize the assessment and collection of property taxes. In California, a major corruption scandal involving many of the state's local assessors prompted the legislature to impose new standards for the assessment of property in 1966. The result was improved measurement of rising property values--and a sudden increase in the pace of tax increases. Homeowners across the state resisted with direct action.
Los Angeles homeowners and landlords organized a property tax strike (Lo 1990: 132) . California property owners also used the rights of consultation that voters had won in the Progressive Era to secure a new bargain that further increased their rights of consultation. A coalition of Southern California homeowners' associations began circulating a ballot initiative petition to abolish the property tax in 1968. When that petition failed, several competing groups of activists began circulating alternative ballot initiative policies to cut or limit the tax on homes (see Lo 1990 , Martin 2008 . In 1978, voters had their choice of two initiatives that would severely cut or limit property taxes. The one that passed-an initiative listed on the ballot as "Proposition 13"-combined a strict limit on property taxation with reforms that further increased voters' rights of consultation. Local governments could increase certain local taxes only after submitting them to the voters for approval. A statutory initiative in 1986 extended this requirement to all local tax increases, and a constitutional initiative in 1996 sealed the bargain (see Rueben and Cerdán 2003: 9) . The result was a settlement that gave citizens new rights to veto state extraction.
Homeowners in the San
In New York, the decision to intensify property taxes also provoked resistance. The regression results, reported in Table 1 , confirm that increasing use of the ballot initiative went hand in hand with increasing use of consultation via deliberative assemblies.
[ Table 1 here]
The results are consistent with the historical argument presented here that the property tax revolt--or something that coincided in time with the property tax revolt--really was critical in setting California on a different path from New York. Models 2 and 4 test whether the association between direct democracy and consultation was greater after 1978, when state officials in California had increasingly to worry about securing public approval for any new 14 The finding of a positive and significant correlation between initiatives and town hall forums is robust to a variety of other modeling strategies that ignore the time-series properties of the data (including a linear model estimated by ordinary least squares and a negative binomial model estimated by maximum likelihood). The finding of a positive and significant correlation between initiatives and public workshops, by contrast, is sensitive to the assumptions made about serial autocorrelation. This is to be expected, since the latter time series exhibits more serial autocorrelation. A Durbin-Watson test after an ordinary least squares regression indicated the presence of serially autocorrelated errors, so the Prais-Winsten specification is preferred. I also tested the hypotheses that unit roots were present in each time series, and failed to reject the null hypotheses of no unit root at p<.05 in both cases. After 1978, they were strongly correlated with the number of deliberative assemblies. The results reported in Table 1 imply that in the post-1978 period, we might expect at least one additional town hall forum and six additional public workshops a year to be noticed in the Los Angeles
Times-and more in years with ballot initiatives, at the rate of one additional town hall forum and two additional public workshops for every seven new ballot initiatives.
In short, the rise in new deliberative assemblies was part of a general increase in intensive consultation between state officials and citizens, and this general increase was associated with a period of fiscal conflict.
THE GREAT CONSULTATION AND THE FISCAL THEORY OF DEMOCRATIZATION
The Great Consultation, then, had its origins in the sequence of fiscal bargains struck To be sure, California is not a representative or typical state. It is probably an influential state, however, in part because it is an innovative state in the practice of consultation, and such innovations have a tendency to spread. It is also an instructive case study because of its implications for the study of consultation and deliberation more generally.
One such implication concerns the promise of a state-centered account of the changing practices of consultation. Many classics of political sociology attempted to explain the rise and fall of democratic governments by generalizing from nongovernmental organizations such as political parties (Michels 1959 (Michels [1915 ) or trade unions (Lipset and Trow 1956) . The pioneering scholars of fiscal sociology would reject this style of generalization. States are sufficiently unlike nongovernmental organizations in relevant respects that it is invalid to generalize from the conditions that make for democratic organizations to the conditions that make for democratic states. Indeed, the distinctive qualities of states make them sufficiently influential that for some purposes it is more useful to reverse the lens, and to inquire about the causes of democracy in nongovernmental organizations by studying the causes of democracy in states. Rudolf
Goldscheid, who was one of the founders of the German Sociological Society, went so far as to assert that "sociology that is not oriented towards public finance and fiscal history must remain in an incomplete [lückenhaft] and unsatisfactory condition" (1917: 3) . His injunction to attend to fiscal history is not good advice for understanding every subject in sociology, but it is probably good advice for understanding this one. Nongovernmental organizations that practice consultation are typically structured by their participation in a political field in which states, and the fiscal needs of states, are central. When nongovernmental organizations take up new forms of consultation-the election, the deliberative assembly, and so on-they are often simply taking up practices that were invented for the purpose of fiscal consultation between states and citizens.
Another implication concerns the theory of democracy more generally. Are the new deliberative assemblies a grassroots revival of participatory democratic ideals, or a retreat from formal democratic norms of equality? If we wish to evaluate the assemblies, the question is inescapable. But if we wish to explain the assemblies, the question presents us with a false opposition, since democratic and undemocratic forms of consultation may arise from similar causes. Every actually existing polity that we call a "democracy" is a congeries of institutionalized practices whose relationship to the ideal of rule by the demos is tenuous, approximate, and contested. The history of any such polity is not one-dimensional tug of war between democratic and anti-democratic ideals. It is a history of conflicts and accommodations 32 between real social groups, in which the disposition of shared resources is at stake, and in the course of which conflicts the very modes of negotiation are continually invented and reinvented.
The new deliberative assemblies are one such mode of negotiation. They take their place in this history as a technique of consultation that arose and became institutionalized for some of the same reasons as the other techniques-elections, opinion polls, petitions and parade permitsthat we have come to identify with actually existing democracies. The new deliberative assemblies are not the last such invention we will see. The dependent variables are annual counts of articles in the Los Angeles Times mentioning the phrases "public workshop" and "town hall forum." The reported coefficients are from linear regression models with Prais-Winsten corrections for serially autocorrelated residuals. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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